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Abstract
In this paper we develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium overlapping gener-
ations (OLG) model with endogenous health capital to study the macroeconomic eﬀects
of the Aﬀordable Care Act of March 2010 also known as the Obama health care reform.
We ﬁnd that the insurance mandate enforced with ﬁnes and premium subsidies success-
fully reduces adverse selection in private health insurance markets and subsequently leads
to almost universal coverage of the working age population. On other hand, spending on
health care services increases by almost 6 percent due to moral hazard of the newly in-
sured. Notably, this increase in health spending is partly ﬁnanced by the larger pool of
insured individuals and by government spending. In order to ﬁnance the subsidies the gov-
ernment needs to either introduce a 2.7 percent payroll tax on individuals with incomes
over $200,000, increase the consumption tax rate by about 1.1 percent, or cut government
spending about 1 percent of GDP. A stable outcome across all simulated policies is that the
reform triggers increases in health capital, decreases in labor supply, and decreases in the
capital stock due to crowding out eﬀects and tax distortions. As a consequence steady state
output decreases by up to 2 percent. Overall, we ﬁnd that the reform is socially beneﬁcial
as welfare gains are observed for most generations along the transition path to the new long
run equilibrium.
JEL: H51, I18, I38, E21, E62
Keywords: Aﬀordable Care Act 2010, endogenous health capital, life-cycle health
spending and ﬁnancing, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
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11 Introduction
Most industrialized countries have a health care system that is dominated by the public sector.
In the U.S. health care system, on the other hand, a large part of the working age population
obtains health insurance from their employers who can beneﬁt from a tax deduction when
purchasing private health insurance for their employees. In the U.S. government run health
insurance programs are limited to cover the retired population (Medicare) and the poor (Medi-
caid). This fragmented health insurance system exposes households to considerable ﬁnancial
risk and leaves over 45 million people uninsured. In addition the U.S. health care system is the
most expensive in the world with health care spending reaching 17 percent of GDP in 2010.
The increase in health care costs threatens the solvency of public health insurance programs
like Medicare and Medicaid and in extension the harms the overall government budget deﬁ-
cit. The situation is made worse by demographic shifts that increase the fraction of the older
population which tends to spend more on health care.
In reaction to these challenges, a number of comprehensive health care reforms have been
implemented in recent years with the goal to control the rise of health care spending while also
increasing the number of individuals with health insurance. Of particular importance is the
recently passed Aﬀordable Care Act (March 2010) or the “Obama health care reform,” as it
is often called.1 This reform represents a serious eﬀort towards universal coverage. However,
many of the ﬁnancing issues and therefore the long term ﬁnancial viability of the program have
been questioned. Also, little is known about the reform’s wider implications on the economy,
especially with respect to the additional taxes that will be required to pay for this reform.
Critics maintain that the reform is underfunded and will worsen the U.S. budget deﬁcit over
the next decade.
In this paper we conduct a general equilibrium analysis of the Obama health care reform
i.e. the Aﬀordable Care Act that was passed in the Spring of 2010. We propose an augmented
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium framework that combines a stochastic dynamic general
equilibrium overlapping generations models with heterogenous agents (e.g. see Imrohoroglu,
Imrohoroglu and Joines (1995) and Huggett (1996)) with the Grossman health capital model
(Grossman (1972a)) developed in health economics. We also add idiosyncratic health risk and
public and private health insurance options to model. In addition we account for important
institutional details of the U.S. health insurance system and distinguish between employer
provided group insurance and insurance bought in the individual markets. The main diﬀerence
between these two types of insurances is that group insurance premiums are tax deductible
and community rated. Retired individuals are insured under Medicare. As a consequence,
the demand for medical services and the demand for health insurance are endogenously derived
from the household optimization problem together with consumption, labor supply and savings
1The bill was passed in two steps. The Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act was signed into law
on March 23, 2010 and was amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act on March 30,
2010. The name “Aﬀordable Care Act” is used to refer to the ﬁnal, amended version of the bill (see also
http://www.healthcare.gov).
2decision. The discipline of our approach requires the model to be consistent with an individual’s
behavior over the life-cycle. The model matches insurance take-up rates, health expenditures,
the labor supply, and the aggregate asset accumulation proﬁle over the life-cycle. Important
adverse selection and moral hazard eﬀects are captured due to the endogeneity of insurance
take-up rates and health capital accumulation. Since the model is a general equilibrium model
it also accounts for important price feedback eﬀects that naturally arise as a consequence of
this sizeable health insurance reform.
To conduct quantitative analysis we ﬁrst calibrate the model to data from the U.S. economy
before the reform. We ﬁnd that our model is able to produce life-cycle proﬁles of health
expenditures and health insurance take up ratios that are consistent with data from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) as well as important macro economic aggregates. We next
apply the model to study the macroeconomic eﬀects of the Obama health care reform. Our
key results can be summarized as follows.
First, the fraction of workers insured increases from 61.8 percent in the benchmark economy
to 97.8 percent after the reform. Indeed, mandatory health insurance, enforced by ﬁnes and
premium subsidies, alter the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency losses and welfare beneﬁts of buying
health insurance. The reform subsequently induces low risk workers who now face higher
cost of not having health insurance to participate in the health insurance market. Having
more healthy workers participating in the health insurance markets improves risk-sharing and
drives premiums down. This in return attracts more low risk agents to participate in the health
insurance market and demonstrates how the reform successfully eliminates the adverse selection
problem that plagues private health insurance markets. Most of the increase in insurance
coverage comes from individual markets as the coverage ratios in group markets where already
very high in the pre-reform equilibrium.
Second, health spending increases by about 6 percent due to a moral hazard eﬀect triggered
by the newly insured agents. This increase in health spending is partly ﬁnanced by the larger
pool of insured individuals as well as government subsidies. However, in order to ﬁnance
the reform the government needs to either introduce a 2.7 percent payroll tax on individuals
with incomes over $200,000, cut government spending by about 1 percent of GDP, or increase
consumption taxes by about 1 percent.
Third, in all these experiments the reform triggers increases in health capital and decreases
in labor supply and capital stock due to crowding out eﬀects and tax distortions. What follows
is an eﬃciency loss that results in decreases of steady state output (GDP) of up to 1.7 percent
in some experiments.
Finally, the reform is socially beneﬁcial as welfare gains are observed for generations born up
to ﬁve periods (25 years) before the implementation of the reform. Generations born after the
reform experience welfare gains between 1 or 2 percent of their average per period consumption.
This result implies that the current health insurance system (i.e. the benchmark economy) does
not eﬃciently trade oﬀ the insurance (i.e. gains from risk sharing, reduction of adverse selection
etc.) and incentive eﬀects (i.e. eﬃciency loss due to tax distortions, moral hazard, etc.). The
3additional welfare gain from strengthening the insurance eﬀect outweighs the possible welfare
reduction due to the eﬃciency loss caused by tax distortions and other adverse eﬀects triggered
by almost universal health insurance coverage. The current old generation experiences welfare
losses as they do not live long enough to experience the gains from increases in health capital
due to better access to health care as the reform primarily beneﬁts working age individuals.
Under some scenarios the old generation helps ﬁnance the reform (e.g. when the reform is
ﬁnanced by consumption or lump-sum taxes) without receiving a direct beneﬁt. The welfare
eﬀects are ampliﬁed for the sick and poor as they react more strongly to changes in government
policies.
Related literature. Our paper is related to a growing macro-health literature. Jeske and
Kitao (2009) is one of the ﬁrst eﬀorts to conduct health policy reform using a large scale life-
cycle model with a rich set of institutional details (e.g. distinction between employer provided
group insurance and individually purchased health insurance, realistic taxes, etc.). Kashiwase
(2009) examines a number of ﬁscal policies for universal insurance as well as for ﬁnancing the
growing health care costs. However, these models ignore the micro-foundations of endogenous
health accumulation, utilization of health care and health spending as they model health ex-
penditures as purely exogenous expenditure shocks. These models can therefore not account
for moral hazard eﬀects triggered by changes in insurance coverage ratios. We therefore extend
the analysis and include the process of life-cycle health accumulation, health spending and ﬁn-
ancing into a uniﬁed modeling framework in order to capture the most important interactions
between health spending and ﬁnancing over the life-cycle. Our model therefore incorporates
the moral hazard and adverse selection eﬀects that will inﬂuence the market equilibrium ad-
justments on insurance coverage and aggregate health spending. The model also captures
possible productivity eﬀects of changes in health capital directly. Since these eﬀects can be
large, there is a newly evolving macro-health literature that starts integrating health accumu-
lation processes into more realistic (general equilibrium) life-cycle models for the U.S. economy
(e.g. Suen (2006), Jung and Tran (2008), Jung and Tran (2009), Forseca, Michaud, Galama
and Kapteyn (2009), Feng (2009), Halliday, He and Zhang (2010) and Mariacristina, French
and Jones (2010)).
This paper introduces a rich institutional setup to speciﬁcally model the Aﬀordable Care
Act from a macro dynamic perspective. Other recent papers that have looked at this reform
are Brugenmann and Manovskii (2010) who investigate the implications on ﬁrms decisions to
oﬀer health insurance. They use an inﬁnite horizon model with exogenous health expenditure
shocks and with institutional details of employer-provided health insurance markets. Closely
related to our study is Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2010) who also study the welfare eﬀects
of the health insurance reform bill 2010. However, their model abstracts from labor-leisure
choice, endogenous health accumulation, and endogenous health expenditures. In addition,
they focus on steady state welfare eﬀects and neglect welfare implications over the transition to
the new steady state equilibrium. We believe that these omitted features are important to fully
4understand the macroeconomic eﬀects of the reform in both short-run and long-run horizons.
Our analysis therefore includes all these missing features.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Aﬀordable Care
Act 2010. Section 3 presents the model. In section 4 we present the calibration of the model.
Section 5 contains the results of simulating the reform bill. Section 6 contains results from
alternative policy experiments and section 7 concludes. The appendix contains the deﬁnition
of equilibrium as well as all tables and ﬁgures. A technical appendix with additional details
about the solution algorithm and the data calibration is available on the authors’ website.2
2 The Aﬀordable Care Act
The Aﬀordable Care Act (ACA) introduces a variety of measures to decrease the number of
uninsured individuals and to protect individuals who already have insurance. Some of the
immediate changes include a $250 Medicare drug cost rebate to alleviate the problems caused
by the donut hole in Medicare Part D3 as well as a provision that allows young adults to
stay on their parents’ health insurance up to age 26. Among the most controversial policies
is the insurance mandate that introduces a penalty on individuals without health insurance
starting in 2014. Low income groups and some high risk groups are exempt from the penalty
which can be as high as 2 percent of an individual’s income. In addition, employers with more
than 50 workers will be required to oﬀer group based health insurance or pay a contribution
of $2,000 per worker. In order to assist low income families to buy health insurance the bill
expands the Medicaid eligibility threshold to 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL)
uniformly across all states. In addition, starting in 2014 individuals with income between 133
and 400 percent of the FPL who do not currently have health insurance via their employers
will have access to insurance exchanges where they can buy subsidized health insurance from
participating private insurance companies. The subsidies are income dependent as summarized
in table 1. Insurance companies will not be able to put spending caps into the contracts nor will
they be allowed to discriminate by health status or deny coverage to children with pre-existing
conditions. Limitations on price setting policies of insurance contracts also apply and a 40
percent excise tax on high-end insurance policies (“Gold Plated Insurance Contracts”) will be
introduced in 2018. The reform bill is ﬁnanced by increases in payroll taxes (and expansions of
the payroll tax base) for individuals with incomes higher than $200,000 per year (or $250,000
for families). Various other sources are used to generate additional revenue in order to pay for
the reform (e.g. funds from social security, Medicare, student loans, and others).
2http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/research.htm
3The Donut hole refers to a coverage gap for prescription drugs in Medicare Part D. Individuals spending
between $2,700 − $6,154 on prescription drugs pay fully out of pocket.
53 The model
3.1 Demographics
We use an overlapping generations framework. Agents work for J1 periods and then retire for
J − J1 periods. In each period individuals of age j face an exogenous survival probability πj.
Agents die for sure after J periods. Deceased agents leave an accidental bequest that is taxed
and redistributed equally to all agents alive. The population grows exogenously at an annual
net rate n. We assume stable demographic patterns, so that age j agents make up a constant
fraction  j of the entire population at any point in time. The relative sizes of the cohorts
alive  j and the mass of individuals dying ˜  j in each period (conditional on survival up to the








where years denotes the number of years per model period.
3.2 Technology and ﬁrms
In this economy, there is a continuum of identical ﬁrms that use physical capital K and human
capital L to produce one type of ﬁnal good. The ﬁnal good can be used as either a consumption
good c or as medical services m. We do not model the production of medical services m
separately. The price of consumption goods is normalized to one and the price of medical
services is denoted pm. Each unit of consumption good can be traded for 1
pm units of medical




{F (K,L) − qK − wL}, (1)
taking the rental rate of capital q and the wage rate w as given. Capital depreciates at rate δ
in each period.
3.3 Preferences
Households value consumption c, leisure l, and services s that are derived from health h.
Household preferences are described by a utility function u(c,l,s) where u : R3
++ → R is
C2 and satisﬁes the standard Inada conditions. The technology for the production of health
services that transfers health capital from the current period into health services in the current
period is
s = f (h), (2)
where f′ ≥ 0 and f′′ ≤ 0.
63.4 Health and human capital accumulation
Health and human capital evolve over the lifetime of an agent and depend on the agent’s
investment into health as in Grossman (1972a).
Health capital accumulation. Agents produce health capital via investments into health







where hj denotes the current health capital (or health status), hj−1 denotes last period’s
health capital, mj is the amount of medical services bought in the current period, and εh
j is
an exogenous health shock. Health capital depreciates at rate δh (j) which is a function of
age. The older the agent becomes the faster her health depreciates. Finally, the exogenous
health shock εh
j follows a Markov process with age dependent transition probability matrix Pj.
Transition probabilities to next period’s health shock εj+1 depend on the current health shock
εh















depends on the health
status at the beginning of the current period hj−1 and on the age dependent idiosyncratic labor
productivity εl
j. The transition probabilities for the idiosyncratic labor productivity follow an
age dependent Markov process with transition probability matrix Πj. Let an element of this










where the probability of next period’s labor productivity εl
j+1 depends on today’s productivity
εl
j.4
3.5 Health insurance arrangements
In our benchmark model, agents can buy medical services to improve their health capital. An
agent’s total health expenditure in any given period is pmmj where pm is the price of medical
services and mj is the quantity of medical services purchased to replenish the health stock. Since
health shocks are age-dependent and stochastic, total health expenditures are stochastic.5 To
4We abstract from the link between health and life time i.e. health capital has no eﬀect on survival prob-
abilities in the current model. We are aware that this presents a limitation and that certain mortality eﬀects
cannot be captures (see Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Hall and Jones (2007)). However, given the complexity
of the current model we opted to simplify this dimension to keep the computational structure more tractable.
5Note that we only model discretionary health expenditures pmmj in this paper so that income will have a
strong eﬀect on endogenous total medical expenses. Our setup assumes that given the same magnitude of health
shocks εj, a richer individual will outspend a poor individual. This may be realistic in some circumstances,
7cover their health care cost, agents can buy an insurance contract. We assume that there
are two separate insurance arrangements: private health insurance markets for workers and
Medicare for retirees.
Private health insurance for workers. Working agents have two types of health in-
surance policies available: individual insurance and group insurance. In order to be covered
by insurance, agents have to buy insurance one period prior to the realization of their health
shock. The insurance policy will become active in the following period (one period contract).6
We distinguish between three possible insurance states and use insurance state variable inj
to indicate what type of health insurance an agent has bought in the previous period, where
inj = 0 indicates no insurance, inj = 1 indicates individual insurance, and inj = 2 stands for
group insurance.
Each period an agent has a certain probability to be matched with an employer that provides
group insurance which is indicated with indicator variable iGI = 1. If an employer provides
group insurance, the insurance premium p is tax deductible and insurance companies are not
allowed to screen workers by health or age. If a worker is not oﬀered group insurance from the
employer, iGI = 0, then the worker has the option to buy health insurance in the individual
market at premium p(j,h). In this case the insurance premium is not tax deductible and
the insurance company screens the worker by age and health status. The probability of being
oﬀered group insurance is highly correlated with income, so that the Markov process that
governs the group insurance oﬀer probability will be a function of the income class that an
agent belongs to. Let
ωj+1,j = Pr(iGI,j+1|iGI,j,income)
be the conditional probability that an agent has group insurance status iGI,j+1 in period j +1
given she had group insurance status iGI,j in period j. We collect all conditional probabilities
for group insurance status in the transition probability matrix  income which has dimension
2 × 2 for each income quantile.




min[pm,Ins × mj,γ + ρ(pm,Ins × mj − γ)]
if inj = 0 (no insurance),
if inj = 1,2 (individual/group),
(4)
where γ is the deductible, ρ is the coinsurance rate, pm,Ins is the relative price of health care
paid by insured workers, and pm,noIns is the price of health care paid by uninsured workers. An
uninsured worker pays a higher price pm,noIns > pm,Ins for a unit of medical care everything
else equal. The coinsurance rate ρ is the fraction that the household pays after the insurance
company pays (1 − ρ) of the post deductible amount pm,Ins × mj − γ. Since households have
however, a large fraction of health expenditures in the U.S. is non-discretionary (e.g. health expenditures caused
by catastrophic health events that require surgery etc.). In such cases a poor individual could still incur large
health care costs. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that a rich person will outspend a poor person even
under these circumstances.
6Agents in their ﬁrst period are thus not covered by any insurance by construction.
8to buy insurance before health shocks are revealed we assume that working households in their
last period j = J1 do not pay any insurance premium.
Medicare for retirees. After retirement all agents are covered by Medicare. The medicare
deductible is denoted γMed. Medicare pays a ﬁxed proportion
 
1 − ρMed 
of the post deductible
amount of health expenditures. The total out of pocket health expenditures of a retiree are






, if j > J1, (5)
where pm,Med is the price of health services that retirees with Medicare have to pay. Retired
individuals pay a Medicare Plan B premium pMed. We assume that old agents j > J1 do not
purchase private health insurance.7
Private health insurance contracts. Health insurance contracts are oﬀered by private
health insurance companies. We impose the following proﬁt conditions on insurance contracts
in each period where we allow for cross subsidizing across generations.8 The proﬁt condition
for insurance contracts in the individual market is
(1 + ω) ×
 J1
j=2  j
   










and the proﬁt condition for insurance contracts in the group market is
(1 + ω) ×
 J1
j=2  j
   










where ω is a markup factor that determines the loading costs (ﬁxed costs or proﬁts) of the insur-
ance companies, 1{inj(xj)=1} is an indicator function equal to unity whenever agents bought the
individual health insurance policy, 1{inj(xj)=2} is an indicator function equal to unity whenever
agents bought the group insurance policy, R is the after tax market interest rate, and xj is a
summary vector of states for every agent that will be described later. Proﬁts are redistributed
in equal amounts to all surviving agents. Alternatively, we could discard the proﬁts (“thrown
in the ocean”) in which case we could think of them as loading costs (ﬁxed costs) associated
with running private insurance companies.
Moral hazard and adverse selection issues arise naturally in the model due to information
asymmetry. Insurance companies cannot directly observe the idiosyncratic health shocks and
7According to the Medical Expendiure Panel Survey (MEPS) 2001, only 15% of total health expenditures of
individuals older than 65 are covered by supplementary insurances. Cutler and Wise (2003) report that 97%
of people above age 65 are enrolled in Medicare which covers 56% of their total health expenditures. Medicare
Plan B requires the payment of a monthly premium and a yearly deductible. See Medicare and You (2007) for
a brief summary of Medicare.
8For tractability reasons we abstain from modeling insurance companies as proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms.
9have to reimburse agents based on the actual observed levels of health care spending. Adverse
selection arises because insurance companies cannot observe the risk type therefore cannot price
insurance premiums accordingly. They instead have to charge an average premium that clears
the insurance companies proﬁt condition.9
3.6 Government
The government taxes current workers via a payroll tax and charges Medicare plan B premiums
to cover the cost of the Medicare program for retirees. The program is self-ﬁnancing so that
 J
j=J1+1  j



























In addition, the government runs a PAYG Social Security program which is self-ﬁnanced via a




















Indicator function 1{inj+1(xj)=2} equals unity whenever the agent type xj purchases group in-
surance via their employer. In this case the insurance premium is tax deductible.
Finally, the government taxes consumption at rate τC and income (i.e. wages, interest
income, interest on bequests) at a progressive tax rate ˜ τ (˜ yj) which is a function of taxable
income ˜ y and ﬁnances a social insurance program TSI (e.g. foodstamps, Medicaid) as well as

















Government spending G plays no further role. Accidental bequests are redistributed in a










˜  jaj (xj)dΛ(xj), (11)
where  j and ˜  j denote the surviving and deceased number of agents with age j in time t,
respectively.
9Individual insurance contracts do distinguish agents by age and health status but not by their health shock.
103.7 Household problem







aj is the capital stock at the beginning of the period, hj−1 is the health state at beginning of the
period, inj is the insurance state at the beginning of the period, εh
j is a negative health shock,
εl
j is positive income shock, and iGI indicates whether group insurance from the employer
is available for purchase in this period. Old agents, j > J1 are retired and receive pension
payments. They do not experience income shocks anymore. In addition, they are assumed to



















DW for j ≤ J1,
DR for j > J1.
For each xj ∈ Dj let Λ(xj) denote the measure of age j agents with xj ∈ Dj. The fraction
 jΛ(xj) then denotes the measure of age-j agents with xj ∈ Dj with respect to the entire
population of agents in the economy.
3.7.1 Workers
Agents are endowed with one unit of time. Agents can work or enjoy their time as leisure.
Agents receive income in the form of wages, interest income, accidental bequests, and social
insurance. The latter guarantees a minimum consumption level of c. After all shocks are
realized, agents simultaneously decide their consumption cj, leisure lj, stocks of capital for the
next period aj+1, and health service expenditures mj.
Depending on the realization of the group insurance oﬀer state iGI,j, an agent also chooses
the insurance state for the next period inj+1. If the agent is oﬀered group insurance then the
agent can choose between inj+1 = {0,1,2}, paying premiums of zero, p(j,h) for individual
insurance and premium p for group insurance, respectively. If the agent is not oﬀered group
insurance, that is iGI,j = 0, then her choice for next period’s health insurance is reduced to
inj+1 = {0,1}. The household optimization problem for workers j = {1,...,J1 − 1} can be
formulated recursively as











1 + τC 
cj + (1 + g)aj+1 + oW (mj) + 1{inj+1=1}p(j,h) + 1{inj+1=2}p







aj + TBeq 
+ Insprofit1 + Insprofit2 − Taxj + TSI
j ,
110 ≤ aj+1, (2) and (3) where



























+ raj + rTBeq + Insprofit1 + Insprofit2
−0.5
 



















aj + TBeq 
− InsP1 − InsP2
 
.
Variable cj is consumption, lj is leisure, aj+1 is next period’s capital stock10, g is the exogenous
growth rate, oW (mj) is out-of-pocket health expenditure, mj is total health expenditure, R is
the gross interest rate paid on assets aj from the previous period and accidental bequests T
Beq
j ,
Taxj is total taxes paid11, and TSI
j is Social Insurance (e.g. food stamp programs, Medicaid).










is the income tax, and ˜ yW
j is
the tax base for the income tax composed of wage income and interest income on assets, interest
earned on accidental bequests, and proﬁts from insurance companies minus the employee share
of payroll taxes and the premium for health insurance.12
The Social Insurance program TSI
j guarantees a minimum consumption level c. If Social
Insurance is paid out then automatically aj+1 = 0 and inj = 0 (the no insurance state) so that
Social Insurance cannot be used to ﬁnance savings and private health insurance.13 Agents can
10Agents are borrowing constrained, in the sense that that aj+1 ≥ 0. Borrowing constraints can either be
modeled as a wedge between the interest rates on borrowing and lending, or a threshold on the minimum asset
position. See also Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998) for a further discussion.
11If health insurance was provided by the employer, so that premiums would be partly paid for by the employer,
then the tax function would change to












˜ wj − 1{inj=2} (1 − ψ)p
￿
,
where ψ is the fraction of the premium paid for by the employer. Jeske and Kitao (2009) use a similar formulation
to model private vs. employer provided health insurance. We simplify this aspect of the model and assume that
all group health insurance policies are oﬀered via the employer but that the employee pays the entire premium,
so that ψ = 0. The premium is therefore tax deductible in the employee (or household) budget constraint.
We allow for income tax deductibility of insurance premiums due to IRC provision 125 (Cafeteria Plans) that
allow employers to set up tax free accounts for their employees in order to pay qualiﬁed health expenses but also
the employee share of health insurance premiums.
12We assume that only interest earned on bequests are taxed. The U.S. income tax code contains many
provisions that allow for the exclusion of bequests from income taxes.
13The stipulations for Medicaid eligibility encompass maximum income levels but also maximum wealth levels.
Some individuals who fail to be classiﬁed as ’categorically needy’ because their savingsa are too high could still
be eligibile as ’medically needy’ (e.g. caretaker relatives, aged persons older than 65, blind individuals, etc.)
We will therefore make the simplifying assumption that before the Social Insurance program kicks in the
individual has to use up all her wealth. Jeske and Kitao (2009) follows a similar approach. See also:
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility
for details on Medicaid eligibility.
12only buy individual or group insurance if they have suﬃcient funds to do so, that is whenever











− oW (mj) − Taxj,











− oW (mj) − Taxj.
The social insurance program will not pay for their health insurance. In their last working
period, workers will not buy private insurance anymore because they become eligible for Medi-
care when retired.
3.7.2 Retirees
Retired agents are insured under Medicare and by deﬁnition do not buy any more private health
insurance. The household problem for a retired agent j ≥ J1 +1 can be formulated recursively
as










1 + τC 






− Taxj + TSoc
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j ,
0 ≤ aj+1, where























Note that retired agents cannot buy private health insurance anymore so that inj+1 = 0 by
deﬁnition. The only remaining idiosyncratic shock for retirees is the health shock εh
j.
4 Parameterization and estimation
We provide a deﬁnition of the competitive equilibrium of the benchmark economy in the ap-
pendix. We use a standard numeric algorithm to solve the model.14 For the calibration we
distinguish between two sets of parameters. The ﬁrst set is estimated independently from our
model and based on either our own estimates using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) or estimates provided by other studies. We summarize these predetermined
parameters in table 2. The second set of parameters is chosen so that model-generated data
match a given set of targets from U.S. data. These free parameters are presented in table 3.
14We discuss the algorithm in the technical appendix, which is available on the authors’ website at:
http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/research.htm
13Model generated data moments and target moments from U.S. data are juxtaposed in table 4.
4.1 Demographics
One period is deﬁned as 5 years. We model households from age 20 to age 90 which results in
J = 14 periods. The annual conditional survival probabilities are taken from U.S. life-tables in
2003 and adjusted for period length.15 The population growth rate for the U.S. was 1.2 percent
on average from 1950 to 1997 according to the Council of Economic Advisors (1998). In the
model the total population over the age of 65 is 17.35 percent which is very close to the 17.4
percent in the census.
4.2 Technology and ﬁrms
We impose a standard Cobb-Douglas production technology,
F (K,L) = AKαL1−α,
and choose a capital share of α = 0.33 and an annual capital depreciation rate δ of 10 percent,
which are both similar to standard values in the calibration literature (e.g. Kydland and
Prescott (1982)).
4.3 Preferences
We choose a Cobb-Douglas type utility function of the form
u(c,l,s) =
  
cηl1−η κ s1−κ 1−σ
1 − σ
,
where η is the intensity parameter of consumption relative to leisure, κ is the intensity parameter
of health services relative to consumption and leisure, and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal
rate of substitution (or relative risk aversion parameter). This functional form ensures that
marginal utility of consumption declines as health deteriorates which has been pointed out in
empirical work by Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2008). In addition, this particular
functional form will facilitate the welfare analysis over the transitions as described later.
We set σ = 2.5 and the time preference parameter β = 1.0 to match the capital output ratio
and the interest rate. It is understood that in a general equilibrium model every parameter
aﬀects all equilibrium variables. Here we associate parameters with those equilibrium variables
that are the most directly (quantitatively) aﬀected. The intensity parameter η is 0.25 to match
the average labor supply and the shape of the life-cycle labor supply curve, and κ is 0.79 to
match the ratio between ﬁnal goods consumption and medical consumption. In conjunction
with the health productivity parameters (φj and ξ) these preference weights also ensure that
15ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Publications/NVSR/54_14/Table01.xls
14the model matches total health spending and the fraction of agents with health insurance per
age group.
We assume that health services are produced according to
s = f (h) = Bh̺,
where B and ̺ are parameters governing the process of transforming health capital into ﬂows
of health services. In order to limit the number of parameters in the preferences we follow
Grossman (1972a) and assume a linear technology i.e. ̺ = 1. Since we assume that the
preferences have a Cobb-Douglas form, parameter B is simply a scaling factor and has no
eﬀect on the relative allocation of resources. We normalize B = 1.
4.4 Health capital accumulation











Trend       
(1 − δh,j)hj−1 +
Disturbance     
εh
j . (14)
The ﬁrst component is a health production function that uses health services m as inputs to
produce new quantities of health capital. Agents can use health services to smooth their hold-
ings of health capital. The second component presents the trend of natural health deterioration
over time. Depreciation rate δh,j is the per period health depreciation of an individual of age j.
Finally, the third component represents a stochastic disturbance to health which is assumed to
be age dependent. This law of motion for health is widely used in the Grossman literature. In-
deed, the ﬁrst two components are employed in the original deterministic analysis of Grossman
(1972a). The third component can be thought of as a random depreciation rate as discussed in
Grossman (2000). Calibrating the law of motion for health is non-trivial for two reasons. First,
there is no consensus on how to measure health capital. Second, to the best of our knowledge
suitable estimates for health production processes within macro modeling frameworks do not
exist.
A proxy for health capital. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) contains
two possible sources of information on health status that could serve as a measure of health
capital: self-reported health status and the health index Short-Form 12 Version 2 (SF−12v2).16
Many previous studies use the former as a proxy for health capital and health shocks (e.g.
Mariacristina, French and Jones (2010)). However this measure is very subjective and not
really comparable over age (i.e. the deﬁnition of “excellent” health may mean something
entirely diﬀerent for a 20 or 60 year old individual). The SF − 12v2 is a more objective
16The SF − 12v2 includes twelve health measures about physical and mental health. There are two versions
of this index available, one for physical health and one for mental health. Both measures use the same variables
to construct the index but the physical health index puts more weight on variables measuring physical health
components (compare Ware, Kosinski and Keller (1996) for further details about this health index). For this
study we will concentrate on the physical health component of the measure.
15measure of health. This index is widely used in the health economics literature to assess health
improvements after medical treatments in hospitals. For this reason, we use the SF − 12v2 as
measure for health capital in our model.
A metric space for health capital. In order to construct a health capital grid in the
model based on data, we use a linear transformation function. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the distance between
actual thresholds for minimum and maximum holdings of health capital in the data and then
transform these thresholds into suitable model values. We do so by normalizing the distance
between the observed minimum value hmin
d and the observed maximum value hmax
d (subscript d
indicates that this variable originates from the data) of the SF −12v2. This normalized range








. In the second step, we deﬁne
the lower bound of the health grid in the model hmin
m (subscript m indicates that this variable
originates from the model) and calculate the corresponding upper bound of health capital in
the model as hmax
m = rd × hmin
m + hmin
m . The lower bound hmin
m is treated as a free parameter
whose magnitude will inﬂuence the model outcome. It therefore has to be calibrated and is
chosen in conjunction with the health production parameters φj and ξ.
Health depreciation rates. We next approximate the natural rate of health depreciation
δh,j per age group. We again use MEPS data to calculate the average health capital   hj (as
measured by the SF −12v2 index) per age group of individuals with group insurance and zero
health spending in any given year. We then postulate that such individuals did not incur a
negative health shock in this period as they could easily aﬀord to buy medical services m to
replenish their health due to their insurance status. This means that for those individuals
εh
j = 0 and mj = 0. By setting mj and εh
j in expression (14) equal to zero, we can approximate
the average law of motion to
  hj =
Trend       
(1 − δh,j)  hj−1,
from which we can recover the age dependent natural rate of health depreciation δh,j. The
depreciation rates fall between 0.6 and 2.13 percent per period. Note that these values are
rather small because they do not contain the negative health shocks that are modeled separately.
Health shocks. We separate individuals into three groups: group 1, whose health capital
levels fall into the 33rd percentile of age j individuals, group 2 whose health capital levels fall
between the 33rd and the 66th percentile, and group 3 whose health capital is above the 66
health capital percentile. We then assume that group 1 experienced a “good” health shock,
group two experienced a “moderate” health shock, and group three suﬀered from a “bad”
health shock. We then construct the transition probability matrix of health shocks by counting
how many individuals move across groups between two consecutive years in MEPS data. The
health transition matrices range from



















16To construct the magnitude of health shocks, we normalize the size of the “good” health shock
to zero. The magnitude of the “moderate” and the “bad” health shocks, experienced by group
two and three, is the distance between the health capital averages of the three groups in the





























results in age dependent health shocks ranging from
εh
1 = {0.0, −0.60, −1.53} to εh
14 = {0.0, −0.82, −1.60}. (16)
The health production technology. Grossman (1972) and Stratmann (1999) estimate
positive eﬀects of medical services on measures of health outcomes. However, we are not aware
of any precise estimates for parameters φj and ξ in expression (3). Previous studies using
similar health production technology normalize the productivity parameter φj to unity and
set ξ to match medical expenditures as a share of GDP (e.g. see Suen (2006)). We follow a
similar approach to pin down the range for these parameter values. However, we allow φj to
be age-dependent and calibrate ξ and φj together to match aggregate health expenditures and
the medical expenditure proﬁle over age (see ﬁgure 2).
4.5 Human capital accumulation














for j = {1,...,J1}, (17)
where εl
j is working productivity, hj−1 is the agent’s health capital in the previous period, θ ≥ 0
is a parameter governing how health capital contributes to eﬀective labor (or human capital)
and χ ∈ [0,1] is an aggregation parameter.
Labor productivity proﬁles. Proﬁle εl
j is exogenously estimated from MEPS data and
mimics the hump-shaped income process over the life-cycle for three separate income groups:
low, middle, and high and is based on hours worked. We estimate eﬃciency proﬁles for three
separate income quantiles and then calculate the transition probabilities of going from one
quantile to another, conditioning on the age of the worker. The resulting estimates for the age




















where j = {1,...,J1 − 1}.
Health as an investment good. Eﬀective human capital ej is dependent on the agent’s
productivity endowment εl
j and health state hj−1 guided by parameters on θ and χ. We use
parameter θ to determine the degree of the investment function of health. In other words,
17an otherwise identical individual will be more productive and have higher income if she has
relatively better health (e.g. fewer sick days, better career advancement of healthy individuals,
etc.). Tuning parameter θ allows us to gradually diminish the inﬂuence of health on the pro-
duction process while holding the exogenous age dependent component ﬁxed. This parameter
determines to what degree health is an investment good. If θ = 0 then health is a consumption
good only and does not inﬂuence wage income anymore. If θ > 0, wage income becomes health
dependent and therefore health has investment good characteristics as well. In our benchmark
model we pick θ = 0 so that health is a pure consumption good. We then consider a case with
θ > 0 in a section on sensitivity analysis. We are not aware of any estimates for parameter χ
and set it equal to 0.9 to match labor supply over the life-cycle.
Taking the endogenous health capital accumulation into account, the model reproduces
the hump shaped average eﬃciency units that can be observed in the data (e.g. Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2004) show similar income patterns using data from the Consumer
Expenditures Survey).
4.6 Health insurance markets
Group insurance oﬀer. MEPS data contains information about whether agents have re-
ceived a group health insurance oﬀer from their employer. Since we need to track two possible
insurance oﬀer states no − offer and offer, we need to construct a 2 × 2 transition matrix.
We use variables from MEPS, OFFER31X, OFFER42X, and OFFER53X. These are dummy
variables that indicate whether an individual was oﬀered health insurance by her employer in
the speciﬁc year. The numbers 31, 42, and 53 refer to the interview round within the year
(individuals are interviewed 5 times in two years). We assume that an individual was oﬀered
group health insurance when either one of the three variables indicates so. Since the probability
of a group insurance oﬀer will be highly correlated with income, we condition on the income
class of an individual when constructing the transition matrices. That is, for each income class
we count what fraction of individuals with a group oﬀer in year 2004 was still oﬀered group
insurance in 2005. This results in probability π
s′,s
i , where s = {no − offer,offer} in year j,
s′ = {no − offer,offer} in year j + 1 and i denotes the income class. The following income

















Insurance premiums, deductibles and coinsurance rates. Insurance premiums in the
individual markets are dependent on a person’s age and health status. Since age and health
status are highly correlated, we simplify the analysis and assume that insurance companies
in the individual market will price discriminate according to age only. We then use a base
premium and a vector of exogenous age dependent markup rates. Base premiums for group and
individual insurances pG
0 and pI
0 will adjust to clear the insurance companies proﬁt conditions
18(6) and (7). We use data on average premiums provided in The Cost and Beneﬁt of Individual
Health Insurance Plans (2005) to estimate the exogenous age dependent premium markup rate
gj according to
gj = β0 + β1 × j + β2 × j2 + uj, (20)
where uj is an iid random variable with E [uj|j] = 0. The age dependent insurance premium
in the individual market is then the base premium times the markup rate
pj = pI
0 × gj,for all j ∈ {1,...,J1}. (21)
We use MEPS data from 1996−2007 and estimate a median coinsurance rate ρ of 29 percent
for private insurance contracts (Suen (2006) uses a coinsurance rate of 25 percent). We assume
that individual and group insurance contracts have identical coinsurance rates. Deductibles
are endogenous in the model and are expressed as fractions of median income. We impose
that the deductible for private health insurance is γ = 6.4 percent of median income (vs.
1.7 percent based on our own calculations with information from Fronstin and Collins (2006),
Claxton, Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, HeidiWhitmore, Finder, DiJulio and Hawkins (2006), and U.S.
Department of Health 2006). We chose a slightly higher deductible in order to keep premiums
low enough to match the insurance take-up ratios from MEPS.
Price of medical services. In order to pin down the relative price of consumption goods
vs. medical services, we use the average ratio of the consumer price index (CPI) and the
Medical CPI between 1992 and 2006. We calculate the relative price to be pm = 1.15.18 The
price of medical services for uninsured agents is higher than for insured agents. Various studies
have pointed to the fact that uninsured individuals pay up to 50 percent (and more) higher
prices for prescription drugs as well as hospital services (see Playing Fair, State Action to Lower
Prescription Drug Prices (2000)). The national average is a markup of around 60 percent for
the uninsured population (Brown (2006)). We therefore pick pm,nIns = 1.55.
4.7 Government
Social security taxes are τSoc = 12.4 percent on earnings up to $97,500. This contribution is
made by both, employees and employers. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Security tax
rate is a little lower at 10.6 percent and has been used by Jeske and Kitao (2009) in a similar
calibration. We therefore match τSoc at 9 percent by picking the appropriate pension replace-
ment ratio Ψ to be 43 percent.19 The resulting size of the social security program amounts to
6 percent of GDP. This is close to the number reported in the budget tables of the Oﬃce of
18Compare: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu
19In the model social security transfers are deﬁned as T
Soc
j (x) = Ψwej (hj−1) and they are the same for all
agents. Transfers are a function of the active wage of a worker in her last period of work, so that j = J1. In
addition we assume that hj−1 is a constant and the same for all agents. We pick it to be equal
h0,J1+hggridh,J1
2 ,
which is the “middle” health state of the health grid vector. Biggs, Brown and Springstead (2005) report a
45% replacement rate for the average worker in the U.S. and Whitehouse (2003) ﬁnds similar rates for OECD
countries.
19Management and Budget (OMB) for 2008 which is close to 5 percent.
The Medicare tax τMed adjusts to clear expression (8). We ﬁx the premium for Medicare
pMed so that Medicare premium payments are 2.11 percent of GDP as in Jeske and Kitao
(2009). The model then results in a Medicare size of 3.2 percent of GDP which is close to
estimates ranging between 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP reported in Medicare and You (2007) with
a Medicare payroll tax of 2.53 percent in the model.20
Using the current U.S. income tax rates by income group we follow Guner, Kaygusuz and
Ventura (2007) and estimate the following polynomial
margTaxRate (income) = β0 + β1 log(income) + uincome, (22)
where margTaxRate(income) is the marginal tax rate that applies when taxable income equals
income and uincome is an iid random variable with E [uincome|income] = 0. Variable income is
household income normalized with an assumed maximum income level of $400,000. We then ﬁt
equation (22) to the normalized income data. The estimated coeﬃcients for the tax function
are then ˆ β0 = 0.3411 and ˆ β1 = 0.0659 so that the approximate income tax per household
becomes
T (taxable income) = (0.3411 + 0.0659log(income)) × taxable income.21 (23)
In our model, we similarly normalize taxable income of every agent with the maximum income of
the richest agent in the economy to get the normalized variable income. We use this normalized
income directly in expression (23) to calculate income taxes for each individual.22
We ﬁnally choose residual government consumption G as a fraction of output Y to be 16.5
percent so that the consumption tax rate is 5.7 percent (Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994)
report 5.67 percent).
We use data from MEPS 2000-2007 and estimate the median Medicare coinsurance rate to
be 34 percent which includes copayments and expenditures on prescription drugs.23 Deductibles
are endogenous in the model and are expressed as fractions of median income. We impose that
the Medicare deductible is γMed = 9.9 percent of median income (6 percent based on our
calculations using data form the U.S. Department of Health 2006).
20Medicare payroll taxes are 2×1.45 percent on all earnings split in employer and employee contributions (see
Social Security Update 2007 (2007)).
22Another method is to use the tax function estimated in Miguel and Strauss (1994).
23According to Medicare News from November 2005 the coinsurance rates for hospital services under the
Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) will be reduced to 20% of the hospital’s total payment. Overall,
average beneﬁciary copayments for all outpatient services are expected to fall from 33% of total payments in
2005 to 29% in 2006.
Visit: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1506
205 Results
In this section we present the results of the calibrated economy and report on the model ﬁt.
We then simulate the main features of the Aﬀordable Care Act and assess the eﬀects of the
reform on output and welfare.
5.1 Benchmark model
The main goal in the calibration section was to match the model to the life-cycle proﬁles of
health expenditures, insurance take-up rates, labor supply, and assets holdings from MEPS
and other sources.
Life-Cycle Medical Expenditures. Medical consumption accounts for a substantial
part of consumption. The reported fraction of aggregate medical expenditure as share of GDP
is around 16 percent in 2007 according to OECD Health Data 2009. Our model generates total
medical expenditures of 16 percent in terms of GDP. More importantly, our model also matches
the life-cycle pattern of medical expenditures as a fraction of income. The standard models of
consumption and savings in the macroeconomic literature focus on explaining the hump-shape
of non-medical consumption over the life-cycle (e.g. see Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger
(2007)) while neglecting medical consumption. It is documented that health expenditure is an
increasing function in age (e.g. see Jung and Tran (2010)), which indicates that agents are not
able to smooth their medical consumption over age. While the health economics literature has
discussed the eﬀects of age as well as the eﬀects of uncertainty and insurance on the demand
for health capital and the demand for health care over the life-cycle (e.g. Grossman (2000)),
the eﬀects that the deterioration of health has on the consumption and savings portfolio has
been largely neglected. Only recently have there been studies investigating this connection.
Mariacristina, French and Jones (2010) uses exogenous health expenditure shocks to replicate
the upward trend in health expenditures over ages. Very few studies model an endogenous
health capital process that can react to policy changes in the insurance structure. Our macro-
health life-cycle model with endogenous health expenditures is one of these (see panel two in
ﬁgure 2). The distribution of medical expenditures is rather extreme. A very small percentage
of the population spends a large share of total health expenditures. A current limitation of
the model is that we cannot match this distribution. We therefore concentrate our life-cycle
analysis of health spending on group averages (i.e. poor vs. rich, sick vs. healthy).
Number of Insured Workers and Life-Cycle Take-up Ratio. Panel one in ﬁgure
2 presents the hump-shape proﬁle of the fraction of insured agents over the life-cycle from
MEPS. Young agents with low income are less likely on average to buy private health insurance
compared to middle aged agents at the peak of their life-cycle income. Young individuals facing
low health risk are less willing to buy private health insurance than older individuals who are
both, more willing (i.e. they face higher expected negative health shocks) and more able to
buy health insurance. The model generates take-up rates over the life-cycle that are very close
21to the data.
Life-Cycle Wealth and Income Distribution. Panel three in ﬁgure 2 displays average
normalized asset holdings over the life-cycle. The model reproduces the hump shaped pattern
in the data. The data is from Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2009) who use data from the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to construct asset proﬁles. The model does not match
the U.S. wealth and income distribution. This is not a surprise since previous studies (e.g. see
De Nardi (2004)) have shown that life-cycle models fail to match the wealth distribution in the
U.S., especially the top end of the distribution unless additional savings motives like bequests
and intergenerational links are introduced. Panel four shows the labor supply proﬁle over the
life-cycle using data from MEPS 2000-2007.
Life-Cycle Health Capital Accumulation. As discussed in the calibration section we
use the health index Short-Form 12 Version 2 to characterize the dynamics of health over the life-
cycle. Note that initial health endowments, depreciation rates and health shocks are exogenous
inputs to the model. We let individuals optimally decide on health capital accumulation over
their life time. The life-cycle pattern of health capital accumulation is completely determined
by equilibrium conditions within the model. To check whether health capital accumulation is
consistent with the data we plot average health capital levels per age group in panel ﬁve of
ﬁgure 2. The model is able to generate a life-cycle pattern of health capital close to the data.
We also compare the distribution of health capital to the data and ﬁnd that the model tracks
the distribution well except that it overpredicts the very high health capital levels.
Table 4 summarizes the remaining model output and compares it to the data.
5.2 Benchmark experiment
In this section we study the eﬀects of the ACA 2010. We concentrate on modeling the following
key elements of the reform bill.
• Mandate: Private health insurance is compulsory for all workers. Workers who do not
have health insurance face a tax penalty of 2 percent of their income.
• Insurance Exchange: Workers who are not oﬀered insurance from their employers and
whose income is between 133 and 400 percent of the FPL are eligible to buy health
insurance at insurance exchanges at subsidized rates according to table 1. In the model
we divide agents with incomes between 133 and 400 percent of the FPL into three income
groups and assign subsidy rates of either 19, 52, or 86 percent to them. We choose the
thresholds for the FPL in the model to match the population proportions of agent groups
below the FPL and between the new eligibility thresholds of 133 to 400 percent of the
FPL. Table 5 summarizes the share of the newly subsidized individuals together with the
applied subsidy rates.
22• Expansion of Medicaid: The reform bill expands the Medicaid eligibility threshold
uniformly to individuals whose income is below 133 percent of the FPL. In the model,
agents with incomes lower than 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) are therefore
supported with a subsidy rate of 94 percent which according to table 1 is the highest
possible subsidy rate that the bill allows. Individuals who still cannot aﬀord insurance
or whose income is so low that it does not support their minimum level of consumption
will by covered by the social insurance program (i.e. foodstamps) that will pay for
consumption and medical care and maintain a minimum level of consumption and health.
• Financing: The reform bill is ﬁnanced by increases in payroll taxes (and expansions
of the payroll tax base) for individuals with incomes higher than $200,000 per year (or
$250,000 for families). Various other sources are used to generate additional revenue in
order to pay for the reform (e.g. funds from social security, Medicare, student loans, and
others). In our benchmark experiment, we implement a payroll tax on individuals with
incomes higher than 200k to cover the cost of the reform. We will also study alternative
ﬁnancing instruments in the next section.
• Screening: The reform puts new restrictions on the price setting and screening pro-
cedures of insurance companies. Some of them do not allow screening for pre-existing
conditions etc. We therefore, in the model, do not allow for screening in the individual
market anymore, so that the price setting in group and individual markets is now identical
except for the fact that group insurance premiums are still tax deductible.
We report steady state results of the benchmark experiment in column 1 and 2 of table 6.
We also solve for the transition paths between the two steady state equilibria. Our results are
summarized next.
Health insurance coverage. The reform increases the fraction of insured workers from
61.8 percent in the benchmark economy to 97.8 percent in the new regime. This indicates that
the reform greatly reduces the adverse selection problem that plagues private health insurance
markets in general. The key mechanism behind this result is mandatory health insurance, en-
forced by a ﬁne and premium subsidies. The reform imposes a higher cost of staying uninsured
to low risk individuals. Especially healthy and young workers, who tend to be very sensitive
to changes in the insurance premium, start buying health insurance due to the reform. Once
some of these low risk types start buying insurance, premiums decrease signiﬁcantly i.e. premi-
ums for individual-based insurance and for group-based insurance drop by 20 and 2 percent,
respectively. This in return attracts additional low risk agents to participate in the health
insurance market. The almost universal insurance pool in the new equilibrium improves risk-
sharing across agents of all types and mitigates the negative eﬀects of adverse selection that is
prevalent in the current health insurance system.
The expansion of the Medicaid program, another important element of the reform, could
potentially harm some segments of the private health insurance market as it “crowds out” low
23income individuals from the private health insurance markets. If, on the other hand, it turns
out that most of these individuals are high costs agents with low health status levels, then
the expansion of the Medicare program can potentially have a positive eﬀect on the private
health insurance markets (i.e. lower the premiums) despite the crowding out. This is similar
to automatic “cream skimming” where the private health insurance markets retain the low
risk types as Medicaid pools the costly high risk types. This can lower the premiums in the
private markets which in turn attracts additional low risk types. Since in our model most
of the Medicaid eligible population buys private health insurance with the help of the newly
established government subsidies, the size of the social insurance program (that pays for a
minimum level of consumption and health for the lowest income groups) will shrink from 0.6
percent of output to 0.48 percent.24
Health spending. Our results indicate that this particular health care reform increases
total health expenditures by almost 7 percent and the share of GDP spent on health care
increases from 16 to 17.25 percent. As individuals are insured they face a lower eﬀective price
of medical services and they end up buying more of it (moral hazard). Under the reform a
large fraction of the population becomes newly insured and increases its health expenditures.
Note that this increase in health spending is ﬁnanced partly via cost sharing within the larger
insurance pool of individual workers (i.e. healthier individuals cross ﬁnance sicker ones) and
partly by taxes on the rich.
The model captures the dynamics of the health insurance market adjustments to changes
in individuals’ choices of health, health insurance and health expenditures simultaneously.
So the interaction of moral hazard eﬀects with adverse selection eﬀects fully play out in the
model. Moral hazard is made worse as more people having health insurance tend to spend more
which increases insurance premiums and counteracts the reductions in adverse selection eﬀects
described earlier. The previous studies with exogenous health expenditures fail to reﬂect these
important dynamics.
Fiscal cost. We ﬁnd that a tax penalty of 2 percent of income of the uninsured together
with a new payroll tax of 2.7 percent on individuals with incomes higher than $200,000 is
suﬃcient to pay for the subsidies. The new taxes, however, will have distortionary eﬀects as
discussed next.
Aggregate variables. The introduction of a new public health insurance system results
in adverse eﬀects on capital accumulation and labor supply. However, these eﬀects tend to be
relatively small. Aggregate capital is reduced by 1.4 percent due to disincentives for precaution-
ary savings. Since individuals in the model face health and income risk they have two primary
options to insure against such adverse scenarios: (i) self-insurance, i.e. private income from
precautionary savings and extra labor and (ii) private or public health insurance contracts.
These two options are substitutable. Almost 35 percent of workers who were uninsured before
the reform and therefore relied on self-insurance in the benchmark economy now buy health
24In the model the eﬀects of crowding out of private insurance markets by Medicaid are likely to be underes-
timated as parts of the Medicaid program in the model is run via private insurances.
24insurance under the new insurance system. Under the subsidized system previously uninsured
agents substitute self-insurance for a market contract. Subsequently, aggregate capital stock
and labor supply decline, the latter is directly triggered by the payroll tax for higher income
individuals and by a general income eﬀect on the newly insured (i.e. health care as part of their
consumption basket has just become cheaper which triggers income and substitution eﬀects).
Increases in health care spending lead to higher health capital holdings. Since health capital
does not enter the formation of human capital in the benchmark economy (i.e. tuning parameter
θ = 0 in expression (17)), eﬀective human capital decreases with the decrease in labor supply.
Lower human capital together with lower levels of physical capital result in a drop in output
of about 0.5 percent. Notably, the crowding out eﬀect is small because the reform does not
lead to a great expansion of the public health insurance program. Only a small faction of the
population (roughly 10 percent) who are poor enough is eligible for the new subsidies. Indeed,
the reform “boosts” private health insurance markets as it induces “good” agents to switch
from precautionary savings to participate in the insurance market. On the other hand, capital
accumulated through insurance markets is not wasteful as insurance companies invest their
collected premiums in capital markets, which eventually augment the productive capacity of
the entire economy. In summary, the crowding out of capital accumulation is small since the
expansion of the public program is relatively modest.25
As the economy shrinks, so does household income (compare the drop in wage rates). Since
the government still has to pay for the social insurance program and the exogenously ﬁxed
government consumption and we impose a balanced budget condition, we observe a slight rise
in the consumption tax rate from 5.7 to 6.5 percent. This increase in the sales tax together
with the decrease in the eﬀective price of medical services of the newly insured leads to lower
aggregate consumption levels (2 percent drop).
Welfare. We next examine the welfare eﬀects of the new health insurance system. The
main mechanism explaining the welfare outcomes in our benchmark experiment is the trade
oﬀ between (positive) insurance and (negative) incentive eﬀects. As established in the social
insurance literature, when insurance markets are incomplete, the introduction of a social insur-
ance program can potentially improve welfare. However, the success of these programs depends
on how the welfare gains from the insurance eﬀect compare to the eﬃciency losses created by
distortions of the incentive eﬀect. The ACA, like any other publicly run program, should also
be evaluated in the context of this trade-oﬀ.
The new health insurance system leads more agents to buy into insurance which results in
higher levels of health capital and reduced exposure to risk, both of which are welfare improving
(positive insurance eﬀects). On the other hand, the new policy discourages individuals to save
for self-insurance, increases tax rates, and encourages higher spending on health (moral hazard)
which leads to eﬃciency losses (negative incentive eﬀects). The direct result is a drop in output
25In previous work (Jung and Tran (2009)) we model a situation where the government directly provides
universal health insurance via a medical voucher program so that the capital accumulation process is aﬀected
more drastically and declines of steady state capital of about 10 percent were realized under some speciﬁc
ﬁnancing policies.
25which lowers household income.
To explore how these two eﬀects interact in terms of consumer welfare after the reform we
use expected utility of new born generations. Our steady state results in column two of table
8 reveal that the new health insurance system results in an overall welfare gain. This result
implies that the health insurance system in the benchmark economy does not eﬃciently trade
oﬀ between the insurance and incentive eﬀects. The reform indeed improves that trade oﬀ so
that the additional welfare gain from strengthening the insurance eﬀect outweighs the welfare
losses triggered by the drop in output. We conclude that new born generations prefer the new
system.
To get a clearer picture of the welfare eﬀects we solve for transitions and use compensating
consumption as a more intuitive measure of welfare. Transition dynamics are reported in ﬁgure
3 for the main macro aggregates. We then calculate (for every agent over transition time t) the
ﬁxed percentage of consumption that has to be added/subtracted in each period to make the
agent indiﬀerent between the steady state of the original health insurance system and the new
situation under the Obama reform 2010. If an agent’s compensation turns out to be positive,
then the agent loses from the reform as she has to be compensated in order to make her as well
oﬀ as she was before the reform was introduced. If the agent’s compensation is negative, then
the agent beneﬁts from the reform. We report two measures of compensating consumption.
The ﬁrst is the aggregate compensating consumption over all agents in each time period after
the reform expressed as fraction of GDP (ﬁrst panel in ﬁgure 4). This measure puts a clear price
tag on the reform as it is measures lost (or gained) aggregate consumption in terms of GDP for
each period after the reform. The second measure concentrates on evaluating the reform from
the point of view of a particular generation. It expresses the average compensating consumption
of a generation as percentage of the average lifetime consumption of that generation (second
panel in ﬁgure 4). The second measure identiﬁes the winner or loser generations from the
reform.26 We ﬁnd that current retirees lose because of the reform (see panel [2]) while the
current working generation and generations born after the reform is implemented gain up to
about 1 percent of their average life-time consumption.
This is an interesting result, since the transition graph in ﬁgure 3 reveals that aggregate
consumption rates drop slightly. However, aggregate health capital levels increase and so does
the rate of leisure. Both these increases outweigh the drop in consumption rates. That is, the
value of health as a consumption good, outweighs the moderate loss of ﬁnal consumption goods
so that in terms of welfare, agents are better oﬀ. Older agents do not beneﬁt from this trade-oﬀ
since they only get to experience a higher consumption tax and the eﬃciency loss without the
beneﬁt of increased health. Their health is primarily determined by Medicare which is not
aﬀected in a major way by the reform.
Welfare eﬀects by agent type. Finally, we evaluate the welfare eﬀects by health status
and income group. We present compensating consumption levels for sick and healthy agents as
26We present details of the welfare measures in a technical appendix that is available on our website under:
http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/research.htm
26well as for rich and poor agents (see panels 3 and 4 of ﬁgure 4). We ﬁnd that current retirees
lose while current workers gain, regardless of health status and income levels. However, the
magnitudes of the welfare eﬀects diﬀer substantially across intra cohort agent types. Current
retirees with poor health and low income suﬀer more from the reform compared to the healthy
and rich retirees. Since the poor and unhealthy retirees are already participants of public
health insurance programs before the reform, they do not beneﬁt from the new health insurance
arrangement and therefore suﬀer from tax distortions and the decline in income. Meanwhile,
current workers with poor health gain signiﬁcantly more from the reform, compared to healthy
workers. The intuition is straightforward. The reform makes the health insurance market more
accessible for the low income working population. Those agents, who are poor and sick and
were left out of the health insurance market before the reform now have better access to a more
eﬃcient health insurance market.
These welfare results carry important political economy implications. Since the health
insurance reform results in uneven re-distributional eﬀects, the current retiring population
should optimally oppose such a reform while the current working population should support
it. Note that the support from the rich workers is relatively weak, while the support from poor
or sick workers is strong as they beneﬁt the most from the reform.
6 Alternative policies and sensitivity analysis
6.1 Alternative ﬁnancing instruments
In this section we conduct a number of alternative policy experiments to examine how ﬁnancing
the reform can aﬀect the outcome. We consider two alternative ﬁnancing instruments: a tax
neutral reduction of exogenous government consumption (Experiment 2) and a consumption
tax (Experiment 3). We summarize the steady state results in column 3 and 4 in table 6.
Adjusting government consumption. In our ﬁrst alternative policy experiment we
assume the government adjusts its own consumption to ﬁnance the reform. We denote this as
a tax neutral reform since all tax rates remain unchanged. Note that government consumption
is not productive in our model. When we let government consumption adjust we can eliminate
any distortionary eﬀects caused by new or higher taxes. This experiment allows for a rough
estimate of the pure ﬁscal cost of the reform absent any of the tax distortions. Second, this
experiment reveals how an insurance mandate with ﬁnes and premium subsidies aﬀects the
individuals’ optimal portfolio choice independent of distortionary eﬀects triggered by changes
in the tax system.
Our simulation results indicate that the cost of the reform is less than 1 percent of GDP.
Note that we assume that the government keeps tax rates unchanged and adjusts the level of
government consumption, which is wasteful in our model, to ﬁnance the extra spending. In-
creases in government spending for the insurance premium subsidy program and the expansion
of Medicaid is relatively small and very close to the results of the earlier reform. Similarly, this
27reform results in eﬃciency losses while positive welfare eﬀects are maintained.
Adjusting consumption taxes. In experiment number 3 we assume that the government
increases the consumption tax rate to ﬁnance the premium subsidies and the expansion of the
Medicaid program. We report the main results of this experiment in column 4 of table 6. The
reform leads to very similar outcomes, compared to Regime 1 where a payroll tax on the rich
ﬁnanced the reform. As before, the reform triggers an increase in the number of individuals
buying health insurance contracts. The number of insured workers increases from 62 percent
to 97.85 percent. The intuition is similar. That is, the reform mitigates the adverse selection
issue in the private health insurance market. In addition, we also ﬁnd that aggregate health
expenditures increase. Aggregate spending on health care as a fraction of GDP increases from
16 to 17.2 percent. The logic behind this is that ﬁrst, the increase in health spending by
previously uninsured young agents increases due to moral hazard. Second, since the relative
price of the ﬁnal consumption good increases signiﬁcantly, agents who were previously insured
will also increase their health spending. In addition, the slight drop in output also increases
this ratio.
We ﬁnd a small decrease in capital accumulation, which leads to a small decrease of steady
state output of 0.14 percent. The decline in the capital stock is much smaller than under
regime 1 as the tax distortion triggered by the consumption tax is more moderate than the tax
distortion triggered by the payroll tax in regime 1. Consumption taxes only increase moderately
from 5.7 percent to 6.8 percent in the new steady state. This relatively small increase in the
consumption tax rate compared to the 3 percent payroll tax in regime 1 is explained by the
fact that the entire population pays the consumption tax whereas the payroll tax under regime
1 was only levied on the relatively small fraction of individuals with incomes over $200,000
(roughly 4 percent of the population). In response to the increase in the consumption tax
rate agents consume less of the ﬁnal consumption good and direct their spending towards the
consumption of medical services and savings. However, since the negative income eﬀects are
much smaller under the consumption tax regime, aggregate consumption drops by less than in
the benchmark experiment. Overall, we ﬁnd that this reform results in an mild eﬃciency loss
while maintaining a positive welfare outcome.
6.2 Alternative subsidy and penalty rates
In this section we study the role of the penalties for not having insurance and the subsidies
as enforcement mechanisms of the insurance mandate. We ﬁrst consider a situation without
any penalties for uninsured individuals and second, we analyze the eﬀects of the policy without
subsidies to low income individuals.
Absence of tax penalty for individuals without health insurances. We set the
penalty rate for uninsured individuals to zero and re-run the experiment under the three ﬁn-
ancing regimes: (i) payroll tax, (ii) government consumption, and (iii) consumption tax. We
report the results in table 7. We ﬁnd that in the absence of a signiﬁcant penalty for not buying
private health insurance, the private insurance coverage rates only increase to 72 percent leav-
28ing a large portion of the population uninsured. This indicates that the subsidies alone have
a small eﬀect on insurance coverage and if health insurance is not enforced by a tax penalty
on people without health insurance, the low risk type agents will opt out of insurance. From
column 2 in table 7 we also see that in the absence of the penalty, the payroll tax to ﬁnance
the reform is actually slightly higher than in the benchmark regime and the negative eﬃciency
eﬀects (measured as drop in output) are slightly larger. This result carries an important policy
implication. If the reform is enacted using a ﬂawed process (i.e. absence of real enforcement of
the mandate) the outcomes of the reform do not meet the target to signiﬁcantly increase the
population with health insurance, while also worsening the growth prospects of the economy.
Zero subsidy rates. We next investigate the eﬀects of a zero subsidy rate i.e. the
government enforces the health insurance mandate with a penalty on individuals without health
insurance but does not ﬁnancially support low income families to buy health insurance.27 We
report the results of this experiment in table 8. This conﬁrms that the subsidies have little
eﬀect on the insurance take up ratio. This process is really driven more by the tax penalties
which implies that some of the uninsured do either not beneﬁt at all or too little from the
subsidies. In addition, the subsidies to low income families have the most distortive eﬀect on
the economy. So while a signiﬁcant portion of the highly productive population is taxed, the
welfare gains triggered are modest.
6.3 Health as investment good
In the previous experiments we did abstract from any human capital eﬀects triggered by changes
in health status. That is, a sick individual with a low health state had the same eﬀective
human capital (and by extension labor income) as a healthy individual, everything else equal.
Diﬀerences in income between sick and healthy were only indirectly triggered by the persistence
of negative health shocks and the funding requirements that these health shocks impose on
households. In the following experiment we model a more direct channel by letting health
capital become a direct contributing factor to the production of eﬀective human capital, so
that health aﬀects an individual’s wage income directly. In order to do this we set the scaling
parameter θ in expression (17) equal to 0.5. We report steady state results in table 9.
The diﬀerence in the eﬀects on output and the fraction of the newly insured population
is small compared to the experiment without this direct health eﬀect on the formation of
human capital. However, we point to the fact that once health status has a direct eﬀect on
an individual’s income, the respective tax ﬁnancing instrument that will be used plays a more
important role than before. The diﬀerence in the output eﬀect between regime 1 (payroll tax
on the rich) and regime 3 (consumption tax on everybody) are now signiﬁcantly larger than
before as the tax distortion from the newly established payroll tax becomes ampliﬁed. Since
27In the model, individuals with income lower than 133 percent of the FPL are still eligible for Medicaid and
receive a subsidy of 94 percent. Only individuals with income between 133 and 400 percent of the FPL do not
receive any more subsidies in this particular experiment. We can therefore observe a large drop in the subsidies
compared to the earlier experiments.
29the health status contributes to worker productivity, the labor supply of richer workers becomes
more sensitive to increases in the payroll tax as this negative income eﬀect can potentially hurt
their health which then feeds back into lower income etc. Under this scenario, we can observe
a clear preference for using a consumption tax, instead of a payroll tax, to ﬁnance the reform
as negative output eﬀects can be alleviated by almost 1 percent of GDP while still insuring the
same number of additional people. Before, the diﬀerences between the ﬁnancing regimes were
not as stark and in certain scenarios even reversed (compare table 6).
7 Conclusion
Confronted with an ever increasing number of uninsured Americans and health expenditures
exceeding 16 percent of GDP, President Obama signed the Aﬀordable Care Act in early 2010.
This reform is believed to have unknown eﬀects on the U.S. economy and on the welfare
of current and future generations. Many macroeconomic aspects of the reform are largely
unexplored and controversial and public opinion on the beneﬁts of the reform has been divided.
In this paper we develop a realistic OLG general-equilibrium model with endogenous health
capital and evaluate the short and long run macroeconomic eﬀects of the Obama health-care
reform 2010. The general equilibrium approach that we propose is novel and necessary to
capture the dynamics between health accumulation, health spending, health insurance, and
the remaining optimal portfolio decisions of U.S. households.
Our results indicate that the reform almost completely eliminates the adverse selection issue
that is prevalent in today’s private health insurance markets and partly responsible for the high
insurance premiums and the large number of uninsured individuals. The reform increases the
fraction of insured workers to over 98 percent in almost all scenarios. However, the large
number of newly insured workers is also responsible for a 7 percent increase in the aggregate
spending on health care. This is a typical moral hazard eﬀect that often arises in conjunction
with the introduction of any type of insurance. In order to ﬁnance the reform the government
has to either introduce a 2.7 percent payroll tax on the rich, cut government spending by about
1 percent of GDP, or increase consumption taxes by about 1 percent. In most scenarios the
reform triggers an increase in the aggregate health stock, a decrease in labor supply and capital
stock due to tax distortions, and decreases in steady state output of up to 2 percent.
Our quantitative analysis is informative for academics and also useful for policymakers it
merges aspects of health economics, macro economics, and public ﬁnance to shed light on the
likely eﬀects of an important comprehensive health care reform bill. Our paper contributes
to a rapidly growing literature that uses standard macroeconomic models to examine issues
pertaining to health care spending. This paper is another eﬀort to bridge the gap between
macroeconomics and health economics.
Our model can be extended to address a wide range of other health related issues. For
example, the model can be easily modiﬁed to include long-term care, health-related behavior
(such as smoking or exercising), and dietary choice. The extended model can then be used
30to examine issues such as long-term care insurance and obesity etc. Our model can also be
extended to include diﬀerent education levels within each age group. The model can then be
used to examine the relationship between income inequality and inequality in health outcomes.
We leave these potential extensions for future work.
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358 Appendix
8.1 Equilibrium status quo
Deﬁnition 1 Given the transition probability matrices {Pj,Πj}
J
j=1 , and  income, the survival
probabilities {πj}
J
j=1 and the exogenous government policies
 
˜ τ (˜ y(xj)),τC J
j=1 , a competitive




j=1 of individual household
decisions
{cj (xj),lj (xj),aj+1 (xj),mj (xj),inj+1 (xj)}
J
j=1 , aggregate stocks of physical capital and hu-
man capital {K,L}, factor prices {w,q,R}, and insurance premiums {p,p(j,h)}
J
j=1 such that
(a) {cj (xj),ll (xj),aj+1 (xj),mj (xj),inj+1 (xj)}
J
j=1 solves the consumer problem (12) and
(13),
(b) the ﬁrm ﬁrst order conditions hold
w = FL (K,L),
q = FK (K,L),

























(1 − lj (xj))ej(xj)dΛ(xj),
(d) the aggregate resource constraint holds




(c(xj) + pm (xj)m(xj))dΛ(xj) = Y + (1 − δ)K,
(e) the government programs clear so that (8), (9), (10), and (11) hold,
(f) the zero proﬁt conditions of the insurance companies (6) and (7) hold, and









where T ,Λ is a one period transition operator on the distribution.
36Income in percent of FPL Premium subsidy rate
100 − 150% 94%
150 − 200% 77%
200 − 250% 62%
250 − 300% 42%
300 − 350% 25%
350 − 400% 13%
Table 1: Income Levels and Insurance Premium Subsidies for an individual according to An
Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act
by the Congressional Budget Oﬃc, 2009.
8.2 Tables and ﬁgures
Parameters Model Data Source
- Medical expenses per GDP:
pm×M
Y 16.05% 16% MEPS (population 20-85) 1
- Fraction of insured workers:
(private insurance, not counting
uninsured in ﬁrst generation)
62% 60% MEPS 2004/2005 1
- Capital output ratio: K/Y 2.96 3 NIPA 1
- Interest rate: R 4.07% 4% NIPA 1
- Private plan: γ/Median Income 6.5% 1.7% own calculations 1
- Medicare: γMed/Median Income 9.9% 6% own calculations 1
- Size of Social Security: SocSec/Y 6% 5% OMB 2008 1
- Size of Medicare: Medicare/Y 3.2% 2.5 − 3.1% U.S. Department of Health 2007 1
- Payroll tax Social Security: τSoc 9% 6% − 10% IRS 1
- Consumption tax: τC 5.7% 5.67% 1
- Payroll tax Medicare: τMed 2.53% 1.5 − 2.9% Social Security Update 2007 1
-Total tax revenue/Y 24.5% 28.3%
Stephenson (1998) and
Barro and Sahasakul (1986)
1
- Savings proﬁle see ﬁgure 2 6
- Insurance take-up ratios see ﬁgure 2 6
Total number of Moments 24
Table 4: Data vs. Model
37Parameters: Explanation/Source:
- Periods working J1 = 9
- Periods retired J2 = 5
- Population growth rate n = 1.2% CEA (1998)
- Years modeled years = 70 from age 20 to 90
- Total factor productivity A = 1 normalization
- Capital share in production α = 0.33 standard value
- Capital depreciation δ = 10% Kydland and Prescott (1982)
- Health depreciation δh,j= [0.6% − 2.13%] MEPS 2004/2005
- Survival probabilities πj U.S. Life tables 2003
- Health Shocks see (16) MEPS 2004/2005
- Health transition prob. see (15) MEPS 2004/2005
- Productivity shocks see text section 4 MEPS 2004/2005
- Productivity transition prob. see (18) MEPS 2004/2005
- Group insurance transition prob. see (19) MEPS 2004/2005
- Price for medical care
for insured
pm,Ins = 1.15
- Price for medical care
for uninsured
pm,nIns = 1.55 U.S. Census 2004
- Deductible (in %
of median income)
γ = 6.4%
own calculations based on data
from the U.S. Department of Health
- Coinsurance rate ρ = 0.29 0.25 in Suen (2006)
- Medicare premiums/GDP: 2.11% Jeske and Kitao (2010)
Medicare deductible
(in % of median income)
γMed = 9.9%
own calculations based on data
from the U.S. Department of Health
- Coinsurance rate, Medicare ρMed = 0.34
Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (2005)
Table 2: External Parameters
Parameters: Explanation/Source:
- Relative risk aversion σ = 2.5 to match K
Y and R 1
- Preference on consumption
vs. leisure:
η = 0.25 to match labor supply and
p×M
Y 1
- Preference on consumption
and leisure vs. health
κ = 0.79 to match labor supply and
p×M
Y 1
- Discount factor β = 1.0 to match K
Y and R 1
- Health production productivity φj∈[0.7 − 0.99] to match
p×M
Y 14
- Production parameter of health ξ = 0.175 to match
p×M
Y 1
- Human capital production χ = 0.9 to match labor supply 1
- Health productivity θ = 0 used for sensitivity analysis 1
- Pension replacement rate Ψ = 43% to match τsoc= 10% 1
- Residual Government spending ∆C= 16.5% to match size of tax revenue 1












< 100% of FPL 9.6 − 12% 10.2% 94%
100 − 133% of FPL 14.5 − 16.9% 15% 94%
133 − 400% of FPL 38.7% 37% staggered from [19− 86%]
> 200k 3.96% 4.01%




Table 5: Income levels and insurance premium subsidies for an individual according to An
Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act
by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, 2009.
Benchmark [1] τV [2] ∆Cg [3] τC
Output: Y 100.000 99.547 99.408 99.862
Capital: K 100.000 98.589 98.107 99.113
Medical spending: pm ∗ M 100.000 106.973 107.247 106.955
Medical spending: pm ∗ M/Y in % 16.055 17.253 17.321 17.195
Consumption: C 100.000 98.061 99.317 98.409
C/Y 0.399 0.393 0.399 0.394
Weekly hours worked: 39.673 39.741 39.700 39.797
Health capital: H 100.000 101.265 101.300 101.262
Human capital: Hk 100.000 100.022 100.056 100.234
HH gross income 2.108 2.076 2.076 2.078
Workers insured in % 61.777 97.805 98.919 97.847
K/Y 2.961 2.933 2.923 2.939
Interest rate: R in % 4.077 4.122 4.176 4.105
Wages: w 100.000 99.525 99.353 99.629
Welfare -100.000 -99.564 -99.160 -99.555
Consumption tax: τ
C 5.724 6.505 5.724 6.813
Payroll tax: τ
V 0.000 2.733 0.000 0.000
Social security tax: τSS in % 9.018 9.182 9.014 9.181
Medicare Tax: τMed in % 2.527 1.794 2.077 1.803
Income tax rev. in % of GDP: 14.594 14.272 14.372 14.314
Total tax rev. in % of GDP: 24.450 24.172 23.895 24.145
Social insurance in % of GDP 0.610 0.483 0.477 0.482
Subsidy in % of GDP: 0.000 0.211 0.192 0.203
Penalty in % of GDP: 0.000 0.019 0.009 0.018
Govt consumption in % of GDP: 16.500 16.500 15.868 16.500
Base premium ind.: 100.000 80.075 72.989 80.109
Premium group: 100.000 98.743 86.582 98.603
Premium Medicare: 100.000 105.176 99.050 105.383
Table 6: Reform - Obama: Steady state results for the benchmark economy and three policy
experiments with health productivity θ = 0. Column one is the benchmark regime before the
reform. The subsidy rates for health insurance premiums for income groups: 100% − 200% of
FPL, 200% − 300% of FPL, and 300% − 400% of FPL are 86%, 52%, and 19% respectively.
The subsidy rate for individuals with income below 100% of the FPL is 94%. The penalty for
not buying insurance is 2% of gross income. Regime 1: payroll tax on individuals with income
> 200k, Regime 2: tax neutral reform where government consumption adjusts, and Regime 3:
consumption tax is used to ﬁnance the reform.
39Benchmark [1] τV [2] ∆Cg [3] τC
Output: Y 100.000 99.379 99.746 99.708
Capital: K 100.000 99.033 99.231 99.642
Medical spending: pm ∗ M 100.000 106.250 106.983 106.389
Medical spending: pm ∗ M/Y in % 16.055 17.165 17.220 17.131
Consumption: C 100.000 99.430 99.740 99.718
C/Y 0.399 0.400 0.399 0.399
Weekly hours worked: 39.673 39.482 39.669 39.510
Health capital: H 100.000 100.648 100.920 100.655
Human capital: Hk 100.000 99.550 100.001 99.741
HH gross income 2.108 2.086 2.080 2.089
Workers insured in % 61.777 72.096 84.080 72.148
K/Y 2.961 2.951 2.946 2.960
Interest rate: R in % 4.077 4.101 4.107 4.082
Wages: w 100.000 99.829 99.745 99.967
Welfare -100.000 -99.341 -99.227 -99.339
Consumption tax: τ
C 5.724 5.894 5.724 6.255
Payroll tax: τ
V 0.000 2.992 0.000 0.000
Social security tax: τSS in % 9.018 9.015 8.968 9.013
Medicare Tax: τMed in % 2.527 2.104 2.136 2.112
Income tax rev. in % of GDP: 14.594 14.466 14.435 14.512
Total tax rev. in % of GDP: 24.450 24.350 24.011 24.327
Social insurance in % of GDP 0.610 0.527 0.500 0.524
Subsidy in % of GDP: 0.000 0.216 0.196 0.214
Penalty in % of GDP: 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Govt consumption in % of GDP: 16.500 16.500 15.900 16.500
Base premium ind.: 100.000 79.873 72.744 79.842
Premium group: 100.000 124.916 94.408 124.976
Premium Medicare: 100.000 100.166 99.189 100.386
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis - no penalty enforcment: Steady state results for the benchmark
economy and three policy experiments with health productivity θ = 0. Column one is the
benchmark regime before the reform. The subsidy rates for health insurance premiums for
income groups: 100%−200% of FPL, 200%−300% of FPL, and 300%−400% of FPL are 86%,
52%, and 19% respectively. The subsidy rate for individuals with income below 100% of the
FPL is 94%. The penalty for not buying insurance is 0% of gross income. Regime 1:
payroll tax on individuals with income > 200k, Regime 2: tax neutral reform where government
consumption adjusts, and Regime 3: consumption tax is used to ﬁnance the reform.
40Benchmark [1] τV [2] ∆Cg [3] τC
Output: Y 100.000 99.204 99.151 99.363
Capital: K 100.000 98.189 97.783 98.487
Medical spending: pm ∗ M 100.000 106.754 107.185 106.719
Medical spending: pm ∗ M/Y in % 16.055 17.277 17.356 17.244
Consumption: C 100.000 97.748 98.964 97.892
C/Y 0.399 0.394 0.399 0.394
Weekly hours worked: 39.673 39.545 39.570 39.538
Health capital: H 100.000 101.235 101.293 101.230
Human capital: Hk 100.000 99.708 99.831 99.797
HH gross income 2.108 2.074 2.075 2.075
Workers insured in % 61.777 97.246 98.912 97.254
K/Y 2.961 2.931 2.921 2.935
Interest rate: R in % 4.077 4.128 4.188 4.112
Wages: w 100.000 99.495 99.318 99.565
Welfare -100.000 -99.638 -99.233 -99.654
Consumption tax: τ
C 5.724 6.499 5.724 6.755
Payroll tax: τ
V 0.000 1.955 0.000 0.000
Social security tax: τSS in % 9.018 9.182 9.015 9.181
Medicare Tax: τMed in % 2.527 1.815 2.088 1.819
Income tax rev. in % of GDP: 14.594 14.280 14.381 14.306
Total tax rev. in % of GDP: 24.450 24.140 23.910 24.126
Social insurance in % of GDP 0.610 0.491 0.480 0.491
Subsidy in % of GDP: 0.000 0.157 0.137 0.163
Penalty in % of GDP: 0.000 0.024 0.009 0.024
Govt consumption in % of GDP: 16.500 16.500 15.894 16.500
Base premium ind.: 100.000 79.948 72.919 79.940
Premium group: 100.000 98.776 86.494 98.776
Premium Medicare: 100.000 104.827 98.746 105.007
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis - no subsidies: Steady state results for the benchmark economy
and three policy experiments with health productivity θ = 0. Column one is the benchmark
regime before the reform. The subsidy rate for individuals with income below 100% of the
FPL is 94%. No subsidies are pay for any other income groups. The penalty for not
buying insurance is 2% of gross income. Regime 1: payroll tax on individuals with income >
200k, Regime 2: tax neutral reform where government consumption adjusts, and Regime 3:
consumption tax is used to ﬁnance the reform.
41Benchmark [1] τV [2] ∆Cg [3] τC
Output: Y 100.000 98.302 99.155 99.560
Capital: K 100.000 97.727 97.577 98.636
Medical spending: pm ∗ M 100.000 105.815 106.417 106.290
Medical spending: pm ∗ M/Y in % 15.858 17.070 17.020 16.930
Consumption: C 100.000 96.949 99.424 98.366
C/Y 0.402 0.396 0.403 0.397
Weekly hours worked: 39.668 39.530 39.601 39.638
Health capital: H 100.000 101.138 101.177 101.153
Human capital: Hk 100.000 98.587 99.942 100.018
HH gross income 2.238 2.199 2.200 2.206
Workers insured in % 63.237 98.582 99.091 98.498
K/Y 2.957 2.940 2.910 2.929
Interest rate: R in % 4.108 4.119 4.202 4.142
Wages: w 100.000 99.711 99.213 99.542
Welfare -100.000 -99.811 -99.198 -99.594
Consumption tax: τ
C 5.414 6.458 5.414 6.571
Payroll tax: τ
V 0.000 6.576 0.000 0.000
Social security tax: τSS in % 8.979 9.183 8.914 9.135
Medicare Tax: τMed in % 2.555 1.847 2.281 1.969
Income tax rev. in % of GDP: 14.677 14.227 14.451 14.412
Total tax rev. in % of GDP: 24.416 24.060 23.941 24.251
Social insurance in % of GDP 0.586 0.485 0.473 0.476
Subsidy in % of GDP: 0.000 0.243 0.224 0.240
Penalty in % of GDP: 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.012
Govt consumption in % of GDP: 16.500 16.500 15.803 16.500
Base premium ind.: 100.000 83.679 75.529 83.379
Premium group: 100.000 97.076 85.025 96.588
Premium Medicare: 100.000 106.329 97.094 104.582
Table 9: Reform - Obama: Steady state results for the benchmark economy and three policy
experiments with health productivity θ = 0.5. Column one is the benchmark regime before
the reform. The subsidy rates for health insurance premiums for income groups: 100%−200%
of FPL, 200% − 300% of FPL, and 300% −400% of FPL are 86%, 52%, and 19% respectively.
The subsidy rate for individuals with income below 100% of the FPL is 94%. The penalty for
not buying insurance is 2% of gross income. Regime 1: payroll tax on individuals with income
> 200k, Regime 2: tax neutral reform where government consumption adjusts, and Regime 3:
consumption tax is used to ﬁnance the reform.
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Figure 1: MEPS 2004/2005 take up rates of private health insurance and health spending as
























































































[5] Average Health Capital








[6] Distribution of Health Capital
Figure 2: MEPS 2000 − 2007 and the model.



























































Figure 3: Transitions with a payroll tax on the rich ﬁnancing the reform.






































































































































































Figure 4: Welfare over transitions with a payroll tax on the rich ﬁnancing the reform. The
measure in panel [1] puts a price tag on the reform and measures aggregate compensating con-
sumption in terms of GDP. Panels [2], [3], and [4] measure average compensating consumption
per generation in terms of that generations average life-time consumption. The latter identiﬁes
which generations gain or lose form the reform.




























































Figure 5: Transitions with a consumption tax ﬁnancing the reform.






































































































































































Figure 6: Welfare over transitions with a consumption tax ﬁnancing the reform. The measure
in panel [1] puts a price tag on the reform and measures aggregate compensating consumption
in terms of GDP. Panels [2], [3], and [4] measure average compensating consumption per
generation in terms of that generations average life-time consumption. The latter identiﬁes
which generations gain or lose form the reform.
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